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Abstract—Security threats on consumer devices such as 
mobile phones are increasing as the software platforms become 
more open and complex. Therefore, hypervisors, which bring 
potential new secure services to embedded systems, are becoming 
increasingly important. In this paper, we look into how to design 
a hypervisor-based security architecture for an advanced mobile 
phone. Key security components of the architecture have been 
verified through a hypervisor implemented on an emulated ARM 
platform. We compare the hypervisor security architecture with 
TrustZone and summarize the major benefits and limitations of 
the hypervisor approach. In short, hypervisors exhibit several 
advantages such as support of multiple secure execution domains 
and monitoring of non-trusted domains; however, this comes at 
the cost of larger legacy system porting efforts. 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Security has started to become a major differentiator when 
it comes to the design of consumer electronics such as mobile 
or smart phones, media players, residential gateways and 
various networked sensors. While security was previously an 
issue mainly for personal computers and network 
infrastructure, it is now equally important in order for end-
users to be confident in using any kind of consumer 
electronics.  
Security concerns for consumer embedded equipment range 
from reliability (high uptime, robust execution, network 
access etc.) to protection from software attacks such as viruses 
and trojans. In personal equipment like mobile phones, users 
also rely on their devices to handle sensitive information, such 
as online bank credentials or access keys. 
What we currently see is an explosion in the embedded 
software domain with respect to the number of applications 
and usage of open software. Open software platforms and 
operating systems also give more freedom and power to 
attackers, as source code documentation and common hacking 
tools are available.  
Hence, one would expect an increased threat to consumer 
electronic and embedded systems in general. This is indeed 
happening, and we see a boost in mobile viruses and network 
attacks particularly targeting mobile devices or sensitive 
infrastructure embedded devices [1]. 
Moreover, large open software systems subject to frequent 
updates are increasingly being expected to run on mobile 
devices. In order to protect such a system, there is a strong 
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need for partitioning in order to isolate security-critical 
functions from non-security-critical functions as well as 
monitoring the security properties of the system.  
A hypervisor or a Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM) runs at 
the most privileged execution level on a consumer device and, 
with the help of the basic hardware protection mechanisms 
available on most platforms, is a powerful approach to provide 
both secure isolation and monitoring services. 
The major contributions of this paper are the following.  
 We have analyzed the mobile phone scenario and 
based on the analysis we state a set of requirements 
for a hypervisor-based security architecture. 
 We have designed a hypervisor-based solution, 
simulated it in OVP and show that multiple isolated 
secure services can be offered on a mobile platform 
with low overhead. 
 We provide a comparison between TrustZone [2] and 
hypervisor architecture on ARM and show that the 
hypervisor solution exhibits several advantages. 
The paper is organized as follows. First we give an 
overview of related work and the role of hypervisors in 
consumer electronic devices. Next, in Section III, we discuss a 
hypervisor-based security architecture for a mobile platform, 
focusing on the motivations behind the design. In Section IV, 
we compare the suggested hypervisor-based protection 
approach with a system built upon the ARM TrustZone 
architecture. Finally, we conclude in Section V.  
 
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 
A. Virtualization 
Virtualization through the usage of hypervisors
1
 is an old 
technology with origin from IBM in the sixties [4]. While the 
technology almost was abandoned during 1980s and 1990s, 
the situation was drastically changed about ten years ago when 
VMware [5] introduced virtualization by binary translation 
(for the x86 architecture). Currently, we see a formidable 
virtualization usage boost in the computing industry. The 
motivations for introducing virtualization are many:  
 Improved system utilization - multiprogramming 
 Simplified system migration 
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 The virtualization technology we discuss here is the approach when a 
complete software system (including OS) runs on top of a hypervisor. This 
gives the illusion to the guest system of actually running directly upon the real 
hardware and it is often also referred to as system virtualization [3].  
 Reduced downtime at system upgrade 
 Running heterogeneous systems (multiple OSes) on a 
single machine 
 Running legacy applications on new hardware 
 Providing secure execution environments or secure 
monitoring 
Among these, simplified system migration and reduced 
downtime do not really fit into the context of most embedded 
systems. Furthermore, as pointed out in [6], with the current 
trend towards usage of multicore chips, heterogeneous 
operating system support becomes a less viable argument for 
virtualization as each core or a dedicated set of cores in such a 
system can be configured to run a particular OS (as long as the 
memory can be physically partitioned). The system utilization, 
hardware abstraction and not least the security arguments for 
hypervisors are still viable even on multicore chips. 
Virtualization can be achieved using a hypervisor with 
different approaches such as binary translation, 
paravirtualization
2
, or hardware-assisted virtualization, 
supported by Intel and AMD processors on the x86 
architecture. Currently, advanced hardware support for 
virtualization is still lacking in most embedded architectures, 
making paravirtualization or binary translations the most 
viable approaches. However, hypervisors are not the only way 
to achieve virtualization; an alternative approach is through 
using a microkernel such as the OKL4 [7]. 
 
B. Hypervisors for security 
Multiple systems using hypervisors as enablers for security 
services (although not targeting embedded systems) have been 
suggested and designed in recent years. Kernel integrity 
protection of a guest system (the system running on top of the 
hypervisor) was implemented in [8], SecVisor, and in [9], 
UCONKI. The single-guest SecVisor system prevents 
execution of any non-approved code in kernel mode, whereas 
UCONKI presents a more flexible and complex access control 
model governing system subjects (processes and kernel 
modules) and kernel resources (including memory and 
registers) based on rights, attributes, and events with dynamic 
continuity. The Overshadow system [10] and the “Software-
Privacy Preserving Platform” [11] protect applications from 
their OS and each other via memory multi-shadowing – the 
hypervisor exposes an encrypted view of application process 
memory to all other processes, even kernel processes. Another 
hypervisor-based security service was suggested in [12], the 
Patagonix system. In that system the hypervisor is used to 
check all pages to be executed by comparing them to known 
“good binaries”. 
 
C. Virtualization  for consumer devices 
Virtualization as an enabler for security in mobile devices 
was discussed in [13] and the authors also showed how to run 
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 In paravirtualization, the actual guest code is modified to use a different 
interface that is either safer or easier to virtualize, improves performance, or 
both. 
multiple protected OSes on single and multicore systems, 
using the Symbian EKA-2 Nanokernel and the L4 
Microkernel respectively. Even if the authors recognize the 
security potential of virtualization, their approach is a 
common virtualization solution and they do not really make 
any analysis of how hypervisors should be designed or used on 
mobile devices when they are introduced to serve security 
needs.  
In [14], a comparison with focus on consumer electronics is 
made between the microkernel- and hypervisor-based 
approaches to virtualization. The main topic of that study was 
however not security (even if the authors recognize the 
potential security benefits with the isolation provided by 
hypervisors). In particular, they make performance 
comparisons between a Virtual Logix hypervisor [15] and 
OKL4 “pistachio” running on an ARM11 platform with Linux 
as the guest operating system. The overhead and latency 
benchmark figures speak in favor for the hypervisor-based 
approach. However, the results have been criticized for not 
giving a fair comparison as a non-optimized version of OKL4 
was used [16]. Regardless, using a microkernel to achieve 
virtualization typically requires more adaptations in the guest 
system compared to a hypervisor approach, since a hypervisor 
more often attempts to emulate traditional interfaces. From a 
security perspective, L4 has an advantage in that the kernel 
has undergone formal verification [17].  
One of the most widely used virtualization solutions in data 
centers is the open source Xen project [18], which originates 
from Cambridge Computer Laboratory, supported by many 
major computer manufacturers. In [19], a port of Xen to an 
ARM926 mobile platform was demonstrated. Although that 
work shows that it is indeed feasible to run Xen on a rather 
constrained platform, it does not say much about what you 
achieve quantitively from a security perspective. Indeed, a 
direct port inherits vulnerabilities present in the large Xen 
code base [20]. 
A completely different way to isolate execution 
environments is through pure hardware-based separation. This 
approach is taken in the ARM TrustZone architecture [2]. 
ARM TrustZone technology, for ARM11 and ARM Cortex 
embedded processors, offers support for creating two securely 
isolated virtual cores (or “worlds”, as they are termed) on a 
single real core. One world is Secure and the other is Normal. 
TrustZone manages transitions between them through 
hardware interrupts and the so called “monitor” mode, 
preventing state or data from leaking from the Secure world to 
the Normal world. System hardware, including memory and 
peripherals, can be allotted to each world. 
 
III. HYPERVISOR-BASED SECURITY ARCHITECTURE 
Next, we look into the potential security services a 
hypervisor could offer to a mobile platform and the major 
requirements for such services. We also look into a sample 
system with two CPU cores. 
A. Security services and requirements 
Considering current security needs, clearly the main 
“security service” one can expect from a hypervisor layer is 
isolation between execution environments. However, what is 
even more useful on a mobile platform is the possibility to 
combine an open codebase rich-application domain and a real-
time domain with a trusted execution domain on a shared CPU, 
which is exactly the main idea behind the ARM TrustZone 
architecture. This capacity, together with a simple and well-
defined secure interface allowing applications in the open 
domain to use secure services in the trusted domain, is top 
priority. However, taking this one step further, a single entity 
providing secure services is not what one typically would 
expect in a mobile phone. Instead one would like to allow 
multiple stakeholders (operator, banks, enterprise IT 
administration, media provider etc.) to run their secure 
services independently from each other on the very same 
device [21]. Different from an ordinary virtualization scenario, 
these secure services would not necessarily need to run in 
parallel, actually making the isolation-providing hypervisor 
layer simpler than a typical hypervisor design – such as one 
based on the requirements coming from a consolidating server 
system.  
However, the possibility to isolate a set of secure services is 
not enough; it must also be possible to provide this isolation 
without substantially modifying the existing code used in the 
open and closed parts of the system. If the design cannot meet 
this requirement, the hypervisor will most likely not be 
introduced into the system, independent of its security merits. 
In all, we would typically require the following from a 
hypervisor-based mobile platform system architecture (not an 
exhaustive list): 
 It shall be possible to provide the most security- 
critical functions in the system in multiple isolated, 
well-protected trusted execution domains. 
 Small Trusted Computing Base (TCB) and evidence 
for that the TCB is sound. 
 Communication from untrusted domains in the 
system towards trusted domains shall only be 
allowed through well-defined secure interfaces. 
 It shall be possible to provide evidence that no 
information except the information provided through 
the secure interfaces can flow through the system 
(including all kinds of potential leakage through 
peripheral units). 
 It shall not be possible for any application or process 
running in an untrusted or different trusted domain to 
interfere with the process currently running in a 
particular trusted domain. 
 Execution in trusted domains should utilize on-chip 
memory and only rely on encrypted and integrity-
protected data on external memories. 
 It shall be possible to port a legacy software system 
with minimal efforts (few software changes). 
As a second priority, a secure monitoring/enforcement 
service for an open “semi-trusted” domain is an attractive 
security service. The kernel integrity protection service 
offered through the previously mentioned SecVisor [8] is a 
good example. One can also think of other more advanced 
monitoring services such as security policy enforcement. 
However, moving too far in this direction could make the 
hypervisor more complex and radically increase the TCB of 
the system.  
 
The functionality needed to actually provide isolation will 
to a very large extent depend on the available hardware 
characteristics and protection mechanisms like MMU, CPU 
modes and registers, page tables, interrupt controller functions, 
DMA functions and so on in the embedded system. Actually, 
as embedded systems do not have standard hardware 
architecture, the hypervisor design must be closely adapted to 
the actual platform it is supposed to run on. Also, when 
designed for security purposes, most functionality you could 
expect in a hypervisor architecture for a desktop or server 
would not be needed. We illustrate this point and our design 
strategy by looking into a sample architecture on a System on 
Chip (SoC) with two CPU cores in the next subsection. We 
have verified key parts of this architecture on an ARM926 
through an OVP [22] emulation platform. 
 
 
Figure 1. Schematic view of a single chip mobile platform with two 
CPUs, modem and a Graphical Processing Unit (GPU). 
 
B. Mobile platform hypervisor security architecture 
Consider the SoC architecture in Figure 1 which reflects a 
typical architecture one could expect in a modern smart phone 
[23]. The two CPUs run an application OS such as the Linux-
based Android. In this system, with respect to security, we 
need to protect security-critical resources (on-chip memory 
etc.) from illegal accesses from potential hostile resources. 
Hence accesses from the modem and GPU must be restricted. 
We assume that the MMU in the GPU can be statically 
configured to protect vital parts at boot time and also that we 
have physical partitioning or hardware protection restricting 
access to security sensitive resources on the platform from 
potential hostile units such as the modem. 
 Taking the requirements in the previous section into 
account, if we choose to protect the execution on this platform 
through the introduction of a hypervisor layer, we would like 
to achieve the following: 
 Allow multiple trusted execution environments to run 
on one of the two available cores with secure 
interfaces exposed to untrusted domains. 
 Protect the trusted execution environments and their 
data from all processes running on the same and 
other cores in the system as well as physical attacks 
on external memory. 
In addition, we would like to offer integrity protection of 
the application OS kernel running on the cores in the system. 
Combining these together results in the architecture depicted 
in Figure 2. A prerequisite for a high level of security is that 
the system boots into a secure state. The two hypervisor layers 
on the two CPUs are running in the most privileged mode on 
the system and get control at start-up. Once all security 
initializations are complete, the hypervisors hand over 
execution to their respective “guest systems”. The security 
functionality needed from the two hypervisors in the system is 
not symmetric. The main purpose of Hypervisor 2 is to protect 
security-critical resources. Hence, it is only needed to provide 
secure control of the MMU, interrupt controller, watchdog 
timer and DMA in the system. All other functions (including 
device drivers etc.) can be kept untouched, which implies that 
the performance impact stemming from the hypervisor is very 
limited. In addition, Hypervisor 2 should also provide low-
overhead kernel protection (similar to SecVisor) for its 
Android guest. 
Hypervisor 1 is more advanced as it needs to support 
multiple execution environments. It differs from a “classical” 
virtualization case though as the various services (the Secure 
Services in Figure 2) do not necessarily need to run in parallel, 
making the hypervisor overhead much smaller. Similar to 
Hypervisor 2, Hypervisor 1 should provide integrity protection 
of the Android kernel. The secure services running in the 
trusted domains are made available to the applications through 
dedicated hypercalls implemented in the hypervisor layer. 
 
Figure 2. System protection architecture. 
 
Preferably, the services running in the trusted execution 
environments should be loaded by Hypervisor 1 or trusted 
boot code into the on-chip RAM in the system. The secure 
services should then make sure to only read and write 
encrypted and integrity-protected data from and to the external 
memories. This gives a basic level of protection against 
physical attacks on the system. 
In order to verify this architecture we have implemented a 
simple hypervisor layer running above an OVP-simulated 
ARM926ejs core. As the main purpose was to verify the 
hypervisor layer and its security properties, our prototype 
system runs only a simple OS, FreeRTOS, and not a rich OS 
such as Android. The hypervisor shields critical hardware, and 
supports protected memory regions and fast switching 
between virtual guest modes via the ARMv5 MMU’s page 
table and domain features. This architecture is sufficient to 
support multiple secure isolated services running alongside a 
FreeRTOS real-time scheduling kernel and its tasks. 
Our test programs, designed to stress the hypervisor’s key 
performance burdens, including guest mode switching, 
hypercalls, and interrupt handling, experienced approximately 
a mere 2 to 7% overhead in terms of instruction counts
3
 on our 
simulated platform. Additionally, porting the platform-
dependent portions of the FreeRTOS kernel necessitated only 
an acceptable level of paravirtualization effort, making the 
platform as a whole feasible. Finally, we anticipate that 
moving to ARMv6, whose MMU includes a non-executable  
bit, will enable also low-overhead kernel integrity protection. 
We eventually intend to fully implement the proposed 
architecture, which will include additional features such as 
providing efficient hypervisor support for virtual address 
spaces in the primary guest OS, and allowing a broad range of 
interrupt support. 
 
IV. COMPARISON WITH ARM TRUSTZONE 
What do we gain by making a design as the one described in 
Section III compared to doing the very same with a TrustZone 
architecture? The answer depends on the particular security 
goals. However, TrustZone is only available on a limited set 
of the ARM family CPUs. Moreover, it requires that the SoC 
design is made according to the TrustZone principles from the 
very beginning in order to work, as sensitive units such as 
DMA, memory interfaces, and interrupt controllers must be 
designed to support TrustZone. Hence, if we in principle 
fulfill the same security requirements using only the MMU, 
standard peripheral units and standard processor protection 
mechanisms, why not use such a design instead as long as the 
performance impacts are reasonable? Furthermore, TrustZone 
does not allow the Secure world to interpose on and monitor 
all the important events in the Normal world, as a hypervisor 
can.  Table I below summarizes the main differences between 
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 Instruction counts are our best metric for now, as actual timing benchmarks 
will not be meaningful on our OVP simulation platform. 
the two approaches with respect to the expected security 
characteristics we identified in Section III.  
Almost as important as the pure security aspects are the 
software porting impacts. TrustZone leaves the legacy system 
in principle untouched (only trusted channel adaptations) 
while the hypervisor-based approach typically requires 
substantially larger porting (or paravirtualization) efforts due 
to the requirement of running the hypervisor in privileged 




COMPARISON BETWEEN TRUSTZONE AND HYPERVISOR 






Single trusted execution 
domain. Multiple 
domains can be 
implemented inside the 
“secure world” through a 
secure OS. 
Multiple trusted execution 
environments provided 
through the hypervisor 
layers, i.e., not specific 
requirements on the OS or 
OSes in trusted domains. 
TCB Monitor, CPU, Interrupt 
controller, on chip RAM, 
Boot ROM, security 
critical peripherals 
(DMA, Watchdog etc.) 
Hypervisor, CPU, MMU, 
on chip RAM, Boot ROM 
Secure 
interface 
ARM secure channel 
API 





Secure monitoring of the 
non-trusted domain is 
not possible  
Kernel integrity or more 
advanced secure services 
provided  by the hypervisor 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
As noted in many previous works, isolation through 
virtualization is very attractive from a security point of view. 
Due to the heterogeneity in mobile platform architectures, we 
need carefully adapted designs that suit the needs for the 
particular target system. Such designs, combined with 
thorough analysis as well as formal verification of key 
security properties of the design, have good potential for 
securing future systems. In particular, as we have shown, a 
hypervisor can provide secure on-chip execution with very 
limited performance and reasonable software porting costs. 
Compared to the alternative architecture built around ARM 
TrustZone, the major advantages of a hypervisor design lie in 
a smaller hardware TCB, support of multiple secure execution 
domains and the possibilities to run on many embedded 
architectures without any need for hardware 
changes/adaptations. Furthermore, hypervisors enable secure 
interposition and monitoring of non-trusted domains which is 
not possible in a TrustZone architecture. This flexibility 
comes at the price of larger legacy system porting efforts, 
slightly lesser performance and larger software TCB. 
In order for hypervisor-based security to really succeed, 
there is a need for industry standardization regarding how to 
write and interface to secure services in a trusted domain. 
Without such in place, there is a risk that a large number of 
different solutions will appear on the market, preventing broad 
adoption of the technology. 
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